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Summary 
This thesis investigates Initial Public Offerings (IPO) on Oslo Stock Exchange between 2006 
and 2011. The analyses examine how the IPOs are priced relative to the indicative price 
range, and how this affects the performance. In addition, the effect of a previous listing in 
the OTC-market, issue size and the use of a Green Shoe Option (GSO) have been examined.  
Based on my analyses I find the average market adjusted initial return to be marginally 
positive, and it seems to decline in the longer run. 
When investigating how the IPOs were priced relative to the indicative price range I find the 
majority to be priced in the lower part of the range. I also observe that small bookbuilt IPOs 
and IPOs sold without a GSO more frequently were priced below the midpoint of the range. 
The analysis indicates that IPOs priced in the upper part of the range perform better in the 
aftermarket. The regression analyses suggest that both private and public information are 
only partially incorporated into the issue price. 
My results indicate that companies previously listed in the OTC-market and large issues 
experience less fluctuation after the introduction. Furthermore, every IPO using fixed-price 
was characterized as small. Finally, I find that fixed-price was more often used among 
former OTC-listed companies.  
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1. Introduction 
An initial public offering (IPO) is when a company for the first time offers shares to the 
public through a listing on a stock exchange. Therefore, few events during a company’s 
lifetime are as major in scale and consequences as an IPO.  
In recent years the world has been exposed to, and is still recovering from, a global financial 
crisis, which influenced the IPO market to a large extent. From September 01, 2008 to 
December 31, 2011, 40 companies decided to go public in Norway. This is a relatively low 
number of IPOs compared to the period between January 01, 2006 and August 31, 2008 
when 102 firms completed an IPO in the Norwegian market. The crisis was triggered by 
valuation and liquidity problems in the U.S. banking system, and these problems resulted in 
the collapse of large financial institutions and downturns in the stock markets worldwide 
during autumn 2008. Out of the 16 IPOs completed in 2008, only three took place after 
August. In addition, between October 31, 2008 and September 30, 2009 there was no IPO 
activity in the Norwegian IPO market. Based on these statistics it might be of interest to 
compare these two periods in the light of IPO activity. Figure 1 shows how Oslo Børs 
Benchmark Index (OSEBX) responded to the global financial crisis, and highlights the 
distinction between the two periods.  
Figure 1: OSEBX 2006 - 20111 
 
                                                
1 Statistics from Oslo Stock Exchange (May 23, 2012) 
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Most of previous research, both Norwegian and international, on IPOs have focused on the 
underpricing puzzle. Another interesting area is the relationship between the indicative price 
range established in the pre-IPO market and the final offer price and how this affects the 
performance in the aftermarket. This thesis will take a closer look at this area.  
1.1 Problem 
The purpose of this thesis is to see how the IPOs on Oslo Stock Exchange are priced relative 
to their indicative price range and see how this might be linked to their performance in the 
aftermarket, both on short and long term. I wish to compare the period January 01, 2006 – 
August 31, 2008 to September 01, 2008 – December 31, 2011, as these two periods represent 
two different market conditions.  
In addition, I will examine whether there are any differences between companies that have 
been traded in the Over-The-Counter (OTC)-market prior to the listing on Oslo Stock 
Exchange and companies that are traded for the first time on a market place. In Norway we 
observe large variations between IPOs when it comes to issue size, and it might be of interest 
to investigate if the size of the issue affects the IPO in the aftermarket. Finally, the issuing 
firm can stabilize their initial share price by using a green shoe option (GSO), and it might 
also be of interest to investigate to what extent this will affect the IPO and its performance.  
The overall problem will however be: 
“How was the Initial Public Offerings (IPO) between September 01, 2008 and December 31, 
2011 priced relative to the initial price range compared to January 01, 2006 – August 31, 
2008, and how was the return after one trading day, after a week and after six months in the 
two periods? In addition, does a previous listing in the OTC-market, the size of the issue and 
the use of a green shoe option influence the share price development?” 
1.2 Structure 
In chapter 2, the relevant theory and earlier studies concerning price setting of IPOs will be 
presented. It will also include a short explanation of the IPO process. The theory part is 
mainly based on the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) framework.  
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The next chapter, chapter 3, will include the empirical analysis of the share price 
development, both on short and long term. This chapter will be divided into three sections, 
first a presentation of the data, followed by an explanation of the methodology and finally 
the findings will be presented and discussed.  
Chapter 4 will include regression analyses, and will consist of three sections. The first 
section will present the variables, explanatory and control, as well as the regression model. 
The next section will present the findings of the various regressions followed by a critical 
discussion.  
Finally, the thesis ends with a conclusion in chapter 5.  
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2. Theory 
This section of the thesis will concentrate on theory, earlier empirical evidence and studies 
that exist on the area, including the marketing phase, the final pricing of the IPO and share 
price returns in the aftermarket. The theory will mainly be based on the Benveniste and 
Spindt model from 1989.  
2.1 Preparing for the IPO 
Going public is a time-consuming process that demands careful preparation. The process 
begins already many months prior to the actual offer date, and can be seen as a process 
consisting of five phases (Gretland, 1994). The first phase deals with organizing and 
indentifying motives and goals for going public. The next phase is preparation and analysis 
including due diligence, valuation and the development of the prospectus. An important part 
of the preparations is hiring the necessary advisors: an underwriter, auditor and legal 
counsel. The most important one is the underwriter that has the role as intermediary between 
the issuing firm and the investors (Draho, 2004). After analyzing and preparing the IPO, the 
marketing and price setting process begins, which is the central phase in this thesis and will 
be explained in more detail later. The two last phases is the listing on a stock exchange and 
monitoring in the secondary market (Gretland, 1994).  
In Norway the issuer can choose between two different marketplaces for the listing: Oslo 
Børs and Oslo Axess. The final choice between the two markets will in most cases be 
determined by the requirement differences for admission to listing. Oslo Axess has less 
detailed requirements than Oslo Børs and is therefore an attractive alternative for younger 
and smaller companies with less than three years’ history that still wishes a listing on a 
regulated marketplace (www.oslobors.no). Oslo Axess was established in 2007 and filled the 
gap between Oslo Børs and the “grey market” list, OTC.  
2.2 Pricing of IPOs 
When determining the price of an IPO there are three different methods one can use: fixed-
price, auctions and bookbuilding.  
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When using the fixed-price method, the final offer price is set before investors announce 
their bids, and is included in the preliminary prospectus. The underwriter distributes the 
prospectus to different investors and collects bids from them. Finally, the underwriter 
allocates the shares based on the investors’ orders. Fixed-price is not so frequently used in 
Norway today, but is used occasionally and was a popular method earlier.  
The auction method is based on bids from the investors indicating how much and to what 
price they are willing to buy. The price can both be set at the point where supply equals 
demand, or it could be set based on the overall demand so that the allocation is rationed 
(Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet, 2002). The auction method has almost never been seen in 
practice in the Norwegian market.  
Finally, with bookbuilding the final offer price is set after a marketing phase towards 
potential investors. As it is the most commonly used method, bookbuilding will be described 
in more detail below. 
According to Cornelli and Goldreich (2000) bookbuilding has become increasingly common 
in recent years, while Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) state that bookbuilding is the 
dominant method in the world, including Norway. Also, when given choices, issuers, 
underwriters and institutional investors seem to favor bookbuilding rather than fixed-price or 
auctions (Draho, 2004). In my sample, containing 69 IPOs in the Norwegian market, 70 % of 
the firms going public used bookbuilding, while the rest used fixed-price. The sample also 
shows that fixed-price was more often used in the period January 01 2006 – August 31, 
2008, where nearly 35 % of the IPOs used this method in order to determine the price, than 
between September 01, 2008 – December 31, 2011, where only 17 % of the companies 
going public used fixed-price.  
The pricing of an IPO can be seen as a three-stage process (Lowry and Schwert, 2003). First 
the indicative price range is established, and the final offer price is expected to be within this 
range. In order for the underwriter to set a reasonable price range it is necessary to work 
closely with the issuing firm. The underwriter uses valuation techniques, like discounted 
cash flow analysis or by using comparables. Both techniques are normally used, but when 
these two methods come up with different results, the underwriter normally relies on 
comparables based on recent IPOs (Berk and DeMarzo, 2011). Secondly, the offer price is 
 11 
set, which is the price offered to the public. Finally, one can observe the market’s evaluation 
of the firm value as the issue starts trading.  
The marketing of the issue is an important part of the price setting, and IPOs are in general 
marketed in two phases, pre-marketing and bookbuilding (Jenkinson and Jones, 2002).  
2.2.1 Pre-marketing  
The first phase is the pre-marketing phase, which lasts for about a week. European bankers 
tend to spend more time pre-marketing IPOs than they do in the USA. European pre-
marketing can be divided into two sub-categories: Pilot Fishing and Anchor Marketing 
(Financial News, 25.02.2008).  
Pilot Fishing involves testing investor sentiment in order to predict how the market is likely 
to respond to the issue. Pilot fishing can be productive, and is an opportunity for the 
investors to get to know the company in an early phase. In addition, they learn about the 
model, the management and the firm’s strategy, and create relationship with the issuing firm 
(IFR – IPO Roundtable, December 2011).  
The second, Anchor Marketing, is based on obtaining a degree of commitment from key 
investors before a float is launched (Financial News, 25.02.2008). During this pre-marketing 
phase research analysts provide institutional investors with information about the offering, 
and this way they are able to test the enthusiasm for the offering, which can be useful when 
setting the indicative price range. The price range indicates where the investment bank 
expects to set the final offer price, but the range is only indicative and the final price may be 
set outside the range (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001).  
2.2.2 Bookbuilding 
The second phase starts with the publication of the preliminary prospectus, including the 
indicative price range, expected offer size and expected number of shares, and is known as 
the bookbuilding period. This phase will normally last about two weeks where the 
management of the issuing firm and the underwriter go on a “road show” to promote the 
investment case directly towards the investors of interest (Jenkinson and Jones, 2002). 
During the “road show” the issuing firm and the underwriter has two objectives. They want 
to market the issue to investors, but at the same time they seek new and private information 
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from the investors. New information learned during the “road show” may be incorporated 
into the final offer price, and thus result in a more accurate pricing. The price update is the 
percentage change between the midpoint of the indicative price range in the prospectus and 
the offer price (Lowry and Schwert, 2001). The presentations during the “road show” are 
based on the information in the prospectus, and if new information is found relevant, the 
prospectus may have to be revised (Draho, 2004).  
Prior to setting the final offer price for the IPO, the investment bank collects non-binding 
bids from investors during the bookbuilding period. Investors observe private signals along 
with public signals, and their bids are submitted by reporting their private signal to the 
underwriter. The objective of the bookbuilding process is to reveal the private information 
from investors. The bids are divided into “high” and “low”, which is signaling either a 
positive or a negative signal to the issue (Bakke, Leite and Thorburn, 2011). There are three 
different types of bids. A “strike bid” is a bid for a specific number of shares or amount 
regardless of what the final offer price will be. A “limit bid” on the other hand is a bid that 
specifies a maximum price for the shares. Finally, in a “step bid” the investor submits a 
demand schedule as a step function (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2000). The investment bank 
uses the information from the bids to construct a demand curve (Cornelli and Goldreich, 
2001). The offer price is however not set at the point where supply equals demand, but on a 
general level where demand exceeds supply. Any amendment in the final offer price from 
the expected price in the indicative price range presented in the prospectus will to some 
extent reflect new information from investors during the “road show” (Bakke, Leite and 
Thorburn, 2011).   
After the price is set, the shares are allocated to the investors at the discretion of the 
investment bank (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2000). The allocation of shares to the investor can 
both depend on the signal from that particular investor and on signals from the other 
investors invited to participate in the issue (Sherman and Titman, 2000). Investor demand for 
allocations will depend on their private information, thus, the better the private signal, the 
higher demand for shares. It seems like in markets with positive public information, 
investors tend to have positive private signals. This means that the better the private 
information is, the more likely it is that the issue has a positive first-day return (Bakke, Leite 
and Thorburn, 2011). 
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As stated earlier, bookbuilding has become increasingly popular. As an explanation, several 
theories state that the bookbuilding method is designed to better extract information from the 
investors and thus price the issue more accurately and in turn reduce underpricing. This 
theory is consistent with international evidence that shows that countries using the fixed-
price method rather than bookbuilding seem to have more underpricing than countries using 
bookbuilding (Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist, 1994, referred to in Ritter 2003, page 4). 
Underpricing will however never be eliminated completely (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2000). 
On the other hand, Ranjan and Madhusoodanan (2004) find evidence in their study that 
underpricing is less dependent on the pricing mechanism, and more dependent on the size of 
the issue. The study suggests that issues can be underpriced whether they use fixed-price or 
bookbuilding, but that large issues tend to be less underpriced than small issues. Issues using 
bookbuilding are in general large issues, while fixed-price is used on smaller issues, and they 
state that this is the reason why bookbuilding yields less underpricing. It is however 
important to note that there are few studies on this area. 
2.3 Benveniste & Spindt (1989) 
Shares in an offering are proven to be rationed and prices seem to only partially adjust to 
new information collected (Hanley, 1993). Benveniste and Spindt explain why this is the 
case in their study from 1989. They state that any changes in the final offer price from the 
filing of the preliminary prospectus are a product of information from investors to 
underwriters. Good information leads to a final offer price that exceeds the expected price in 
the indicative price range, whereas bad information leads to an offer price below the 
expected price. Investors with negative information have no incentive to not give a truthful 
signal, as by giving a positive signal the investor is awarded with an allocation of the issue at 
a price that is higher than the aftermarket value implied by their private information. The 
incentive for untruthful signaling is however higher for investors with positive information, 
as a negative signal may result in a lower issue price (Bakke, Leite and Thorburn, 2011).  
Benveniste and Spindt developed a model in 1989 of rules regarding pricing and allocation 
that are used by underwriters of IPOs in order to induce investors to reveal their true private 
information (Hanley, 1993). The optimal rule for allocation favors investors who give a 
positive signal. An investor who holds positive information can deflate the IPO price by 
report a negative signal rather than a positive signal, but at the same time the investor risks 
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being left with no allocation (Bakke, Leite and Thorburn 2011). In order for investors to be 
willing to reveal good information to the underwriter they must expect to receive greater 
profits than if they falsely reveal bad information. Benveniste and Spindt’s model states that 
underwriters give preference in allocating shares to investors who reveal positive 
information, which means that investors who decide to falsely give negative information 
may experience a reduction in the allocation of shares, or no allocation (Hanley, 1993). 
According to a model provided by Bakke, Leite and Thorburn (2011), investors are less 
willing to truthfully reveal their private information in bear markets than in bull markets. 
The reason for this is the fact that the probability of being awarded with underpricing after 
giving false information is higher when the public information is negative.  
The high level of initial return associated with IPOs with positive revisions in the final issue 
price is known as the “partial adjustment” phenomenon, a term introduced by Ibbotson, 
Sindelar and Ritter (1988, referred to in Hanley 1993, page 232). The underwriter do not 
fully incorporate positive information learned during bookbuilding when setting the final 
offer price, and the price is therefore only partially adjusted upwards instead of raised to the 
market value.  
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) explain why prices only partially adjust to demand. They state 
that the changes in the final offer price from the filing of the indicative price range to the 
offer date are a product of information learned from investors during the pre-IPO period. 
They claim that the underwriter only partially incorporates positive information learned from 
investors into the final offer price, and in that way grants the investors with compensation in 
form of higher initial return. Thus, positive revisions are usually followed by positive first-
day returns. In other words, the underwriters underprice the IPO (Hanley, 1993). On the 
other hand, negative information is fully incorporated into the price as both underwriters and 
investors want to avoid losses on overpriced issues. In addition, under this partial adjustment 
theory, private information from investors should only be partially incorporated into the 
price, while public information on the other hand should be fully incorporated.  
Loughran and Ritter (2000) find in their study that both public and private information are 
only partially incorporated into the final offer price (Lowry and Schwert, 2001). Bakke, 
Leite and Thorburn (2011) present a model that helps explain the relationship between 
public information and initial returns. Their study builds on the Benveniste and Spindt 
(1989) model explained above. They prove that publicly available information is related to 
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IPO underpricing through two different mechanisms: The demand effect and the incentive 
effect.  
As mentioned earlier, the expected profit from hiding favorable positive information is 
higher in “downmarkets” when the public outlook is negative, thus, investors require a 
higher compensation in form of underpricing in order to reveal positive information. This is 
known as the incentive effect. Further, the study shows that public and private signals are 
unconditionally correlated. As investors are more likely to have good information about an 
issue in an “upmarket”, the probability for underpricing is higher when the public outlook is 
positive. This is what they call the demand effect. When the demand effect dominates, the 
final offer price will only partially adjust to public information, which indicates a positive 
relation between public information and underpricing.  
The paper offers an indirect test of the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argument by examining 
how public information affects investors’ incentives to reveal private information, as implied 
by the incentive effect.  
An important prediction in this model put forth by Benveniste and Spindt is the fact that 
underpricing is related to the level of interest in the pre-IPO phase. This prediction suggests 
that issues priced in the upper part of the indicative price range are likely to be more 
underpriced than other issues (Giudici and Roosenboom, 2002).  
2.3.1 Empirical Evidence 
This thesis investigates among other things the relationship between the indicative price 
range presented in the preliminary prospectus and the final offer price, and how this can be 
linked to the performance in the aftermarket. There are some earlier studies that have 
examined the link between the pre-issue period and the final offer price; six of them are 
presented below.  
Hanley (1993) looks at the relationship between the final offer price and the indicative price 
range, and her results suggest that issues priced at the top of the price range tend to perform 
better in the aftermarket – the partial adjustment phenomenon. The study divides the issues 
into three different categories of where the final offer price is set relative to the indicative 
price range: above, below and within the price range. The findings show that the mean initial 
return for IPOs priced above the range is 20,70 %, whereas for issues priced below the range 
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the initial return is only 0,60 %. According to the study, the initial return for the issues 
priced within the price range is 10,00 %. These findings suggest that there are no 
underpricing in issues priced below the price range, which is consistent with the model 
presented by Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990, referred to in Gondat-Larralde and James, 
2008). This model combines the analysis presented by Rock (1986) and Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989), and predicts that when investors give negative signals in the pre-IPO market, 
the issue will most likely not be underpriced.  
Ritter (2009) provides an overview over IPOs between 1980-2008, and investigates the link 
between the offer price and the indicative price range. In addition to look at the overall 
relationship, he divides the time period into four different periods in order to highlight 
differences. As Hanley (1993), he divides the IPOs into below, within and above the price 
range. In his study he both investigates how many IPOs that are priced below, within and 
above the range in the four different periods and the period as a whole, and how this affects 
the initial return. The results are presented in the tables below. 
 
 
Lowry and Schwert (2001) have also provided a study, and through their study they show 
that the relationship between the offer price and the price range is related to information 
available at the time the preliminary prospectus is presented. The price range presented in 
the prospectus is as mentioned earlier only indicative, and the final offer price can be set 
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outside the range. They conclude that underwriters are more willing to fully incorporate 
negative information learned during the bookbuilding than positive information.   
Bakke, Leite and Thorburn (2011) present three dummy variables in their study that indicate 
if the final offer price is set within the price range or outside (above or below). The first 
dummy variable is the high-demand state (HDS) and captures IPOs priced on or above the 
upper part of the price range. The low-demand state (LDS) represents issues priced on or 
below the lower end of the range. Finally, the last dummy variable is medium demand state 
(MDS) and indicates a final offer price set somewhere within the indicative price range. The 
findings show that the initial return varies across the three different demand states. 
Consistent with the findings of Hanley (1993) and Ritter (2009), the first-day return seems to 
be lowest in LDS and highest in the HDS. The study also suggests that the level of 
underpricing is affected by whether the private information is good or bad. When private 
information is bad, which indicates that the price revision (PU) is less than 0, the average 
level of underpricing is relatively small, with initial return equal to 4 % and 5 % in 
“downmarkets” and “upmarkets” respectively. In addition, consistent with Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989), they find a higher level of underpricing when PU is higher than 0. 
Furthermore, they find that investors require a higher level of underpricing in order for them 
to reveal good information in “downmarkets” than in “upmarkets”. On the other hand, 
investors are more likely to have positive information in “upmarkets”, and hence, the 
probability for underpricing is higher when the public outlook is positive.  
Bakke (2012) investigates why more than a third of the 5000 IPOs in his sample between 
1981 and 2008 accept prices on or below the minimum of the initial price range. He argues 
that issuers are only willing to accept these worst-case prices if the expected returns in the 
aftermarket make up for the foregone assets-in-place. In his study he documents significant 
and robust abnormal returns up towards 5 % during the first months of trading for “cold” 
IPOs. On the other hand, his study finds that “hot” IPOs underperform in the same period. 
The evidence here is however not as strong.2  
Finally, Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) find that out of their sample the average size of the 
price range, as percentage of its midpoint, is 16 %. After the price range is set, the 
                                                
2 Cold IPOs: Low demand state. Hot IPOs: High demand state 
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investment banker collects bids from investors during the bookbuilding, before they set the 
final offer price. Their study shows that on average, the IPO price is 50 % of the way from 
the bottom to the top of the range. In addition, they find that five IPOs out of their sample 
are priced outside the range, four below the minimum price and only once above the 
maximum price. This finding is consistent with Lowry and Schwert’s study from 2001 
presented above, where they find that underwriters tend to incorporate negative information 
more fully than positive information. Further, the study shows that the price is set exactly at 
the bottom of the range in two of the cases, and nine times exactly at the opposite end of the 
range.  
2.4 Share Price Returns 
This thesis examines how the IPOs on Oslo Stock Exchange between 2006 and 2011 
perform after the introduction. Earlier empirical evidence, both Norwegian and international, 
suggest that IPOs have a relatively high initial return, whereas the return on longer term has 
a tendency to be poorer. This chapter will first define underpricing and overpricing before 
presenting theories that try to explain why both underpricing and overpricing exist. Finally, 
earlier empirical findings on the area will be introduced.  
2.4.1 Underpricing 
Most research on IPOs have been linked to underpricing. Underpricing is reflected as the 
positive initial return, and has been one of the most enduring puzzles within financial 
economics. Underpricing can also be measured as the amount of “money left on the table”. 
This is the difference between the price after the first day of trading and the final offer price, 
multiplied with the total number of shares sold at the IPO (Ljunqvist, 2004). According to 
Loughran and Ritter (2002a; 2002b, referred to in Draho, 2004, page 241), as much as 
$27billion was “left on the table” in USA during 1990-1998.  
The term underpricing indicates that the existing owners of the issuing firm have gotten a 
lower price for their shares than what they could have, and researches have investigated 
potential reasons for this phenomenon. The partial adjustment theory has already been 
presented as one explanation, but this is only one of many theories trying to explain the 
phenomenon. According to this theory the largest amount of money left on the table will 
occur when the final offer price is set high in relation to the indicative price range. The 
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extensive research has led to several theories, but because multiple factors pull in different 
directions, no single theory can explain underpricing. The remaining theories can be grouped 
into three categories: Institutional explanations, issuer objectives and behavioral 
explanations. This thesis will focus on the main theories within each category.  
2.4.1.1 Institutional Explanations 
These theories are based on imperfections in the IPO market. It is stated that there are 
informational asymmetries between the different parties participating in the issue, and 
underpricing is therefore an unavoidable cost of going public. This category includes among 
other theories informational rent and winner’s curse. Informational rent states that 
underwriters must underprice bookbuilt IPOs when demand is strong in order to get the 
investors to truthfully reveal information. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Benveniste and 
Wilhelm (1990) note that there is an economic motivation for underpricing IPOs. In order 
for the investment bank to effectively extract the information needed from the investors, they 
need to underprice the IPO.   
The winner’s curse model (Rock, 1986) on the other hand believes that underpricing is a 
necessary tool to make sure that uninformed investors choose to participate. Rock argues that 
there are two types of investors, informed and uninformed. The informed are perfectly 
informed about the true value of the IPO. The Rock model explains that underpricing can be 
seen as compensation to the uninformed for receiving disproportionately large allocations in 
overpriced offerings because the informed selectively choose the underpriced (Leite, 2007).  
2.4.1.2 Issuer Objectives 
An IPO is a major one-time event for a firm, and plays an important role in a firms’ lifecycle 
(Chemmanur, He and Nandy, 2009). Therefore, the issuing firm could have other motives 
with the IPO that can cause additional underpricing.  Underpricing can be used to signal firm 
quality, as firms that are less solid cannot afford to underprice (Welch 1989, referred to in 
Chemmanur, He and Nandy, 2009). Underpricing will in most cases give high initial return 
that leads the company to build goodwill in the market, which they can benefit from in the 
future (Welch, 1989, referred to in Chemmanur, He and Nany, 2009). There are also 
financial incentives, like taxes, that have made CEOs more tolerant to underpricing. Another 
reason worth mentioning is the marketing argument. An IPO is an important branding event 
for the issuing firm, and underpricing can be used instead of traditional marketing 
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techniques, and has proven to be effective for example through attracting traffic to company 
websites (Demers and Lewellen, 2001).  Finally, Shiller (1990) introduced the impresario 
hypothesis as an explanation for underpricing. This hypothesis argues that the IPO market is 
subject to “fads” and suggests that IPOs are underpriced in order to create the appearance of 
excess demand (Ritter, 1998). 
2.4.1.3 Behavioral Explanations 
Behavioral explanations for underpricing put focus towards why the final offer price was too 
low or why the price at the end of the first day of trading was too high. According to 
Loughran and Ritter (2002), prospect theory, presented by Kahneman and Tversky in 1982, 
can help explain why the offer price of IPOs is too low. This theory states that individuals 
tend to care more about their level of wealth relative to the anchored level than they do about 
the absolute amount. In other words, when the offer price is set low and attracts investors, 
the price will increase and the CEO will focus on the positive unexpected wealth and forget 
the money left on the table. In theory, a rational CEO would hope for less underpricing. The 
price at the end of the first day of trading should, according to theory, be an unbiased 
estimate of the share’s intrinsic value, but one can observe prices that are optimistically 
biased. Speculation among retail investors can be a reason why market prices increase to 
irrational levels.  
2.4.2 Overpricing – Long term return 
The positive initial return explained above is often followed by a poor long-run performance 
(Ritter, 1991). This may indicate that companies listed through an IPO are overpriced 
relative to their long-term fundamental value. Several theories have been presented in order 
to explain why IPOs seem to be overpriced in the long run. This thesis will focus on three 
theories: divergence of opinion hypothesis, impresario hypothesis and windows of 
opportunity.  
2.4.2.1 Divergence of Opinion Hypothesis 
According to Miller (1977), the price of a firm facing short sales constraints are determined 
by the beliefs of the most optimistic investors. This leads to high return on short term, while 
the expected return will fall on a longer term. This is known as the Miller effect. The initial 
overvaluation by optimistic investors is corrected in the years after the listing as the 
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uncertainty of IPO-firms subdue. After the listing, more information is available because of 
transparency requirements and analyst coverage, and optimistic and pessimistic investors 
share the opinion of the value of the company to a larger extent (Dong and Michel, 2009). 
2.4.2.2 Impresario Hypothesis 
The impresario hypothesis was mentioned as one of the theories used to explain 
underpricing, but can also help understanding the poor return in the long run. This 
hypothesis states that the companies with the highest first-day return tend to have the lowest 
subsequent returns. According to Shiller (1990), underpricing will lead to increased interest 
for the issue, and in turn lead to high positive initial return. This will however be adjusted in 
the secondary market through negative market-adjusted return in the period after the listing.  
2.4.2.3 Windows of Opportunity 
This hypothesis predicts that firms that choose to go public in high volume periods are more 
likely to experience overvaluation compared to other IPOs. High-volume periods should be 
associated with the lowest long-term returns, and there is evidence that this pattern exists 
(Ritter, 1998).  
2.4.3 Stabilization activity 
Earlier studies present several examples of large underpricing, while large overpricing on the 
first day of trading is rather rare. This can be explained by what is known as stabilization 
activity, where the underwriter initially takes a short position by exercising an overallotment 
option. This might occur through exercising a green shoe option (GSO). A GSO can prevent 
huge price fluctuations, for example caused by “stock flippers”, and can therefore save 
investors from potential loss. “Stock flippers” subscribe to the issue, but they immediately 
re-sell their shares. This way they can create an artificial demand for an IPO that overstates 
the true demand. The short covering in the aftermarket is what prevents a large negative 
initial return on the first day of trading (de Carvalho and Pinheiro, 2008).  
A GSO is according to de Carvalho and Pinheiro (2008) a covenant that gives the 
underwriter the option to buy a complementary number of shares from the issuer at the offer 
price. The underwriter can buy up to an additional 15 % of company shares at the final offer 
price. The issuing firm shall appoint one of the book runners as the stabilization agent, and 
this agent is responsible for the price stabilization process. When the aftermarket price is 
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higher than the offer price, the underwriter will cover the short position by exercising the 
option. On the other hand, when the aftermarket price is below the offer price, the covering 
is made at the market price lower than the offer price. Losses are however possible, and this 
will be the case when the overallotment is larger than the GSO. When this is the case, the 
underwriter must normally repurchase shares to a higher price than the final offer price.  
2.4.4 Empirical Evidence 
Underpricing leads to an abnormal high first-day return. Bakke, Leite and Thorburn (2011) 
find evidence for underpricing in their study. Their final dataset consisted of 5.093 U.S. 
IPOs from 1981 to 2008, and they find an average initial return equal to 19,2 %. In addition, 
they find that the initial return varies over time.  
Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (2008) have compiled studies from 45 different countries 
worldwide, and their findings are a consistently positive initial return. Their study also noted 
that the positive initial return varies between the different markets. Ljunqvist (2004) also 
finds evidence of underpricing in his study. Consistent with the findings of Loughran, Ritter 
and Rydqvist (2008) and Bakke, Leite and Thorburn (2011) he also finds that underpricing 
varies both over time and across different markets.  
As mentioned earlier, bookbuilding has become popular in recent years, and many countries 
have moved from fixed-price to bookbuilding. The reason behind this change of method is 
expected to be that bookbuilding give a more accurate pricing of the issue, which result in 
less underpricing. Ritter (1998) finds evidence for this explanation. Earlier studies of the 
Norwegian IPO market, like Nærland (1994), find underpricing of around 12 % over the two 
first trading days, while more recent studies like Samuelsen and Tveter (2006), find a 
significantly reduced underpricing equal to 2,21 %. This may be related to the fact that 
bookbuilding has replaced the fixed-price method. Ritter (1998) also finds underpricing in 
his study, and also that underpricing varies between different countries. In addition, he finds 
that this variation was related to the method used. However, as mentioned earlier, Ranjan 
and Madhusoodanan (2004) find that underpricing is not dependent on the mechanism used 
to set the price, but rather the size of the issue.  
The second interesting pattern associated with IPOs presented in this thesis is the poor share 
price performance in the long run. Ritter (1998) presents evidence of the long-run 
performance of IPOs. Companies going public between 1970 and 1993 had an average return 
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of 7,9 % per year for the five years after the offering took place. Compared to a control 
group of non-issuing firms (matched by market capitalization) with average annual returns of 
13,1 %, the IPOs underperform by 5,2 % per year. The study also presents international 
evidence on long-run performance of IPOs and can be viewed in the table below.  
 
IPO literature divides the market into “hot” and “cold” issue markets. “Hot” issue markets 
are recognized as periods where the average aftermarket performance of IPOs is abnormally 
high (Ibbtson and Jaffe, 1975). In a “cold” market, rational investors set the prices as no 
exuberant investors exist, which result in no underpricing or long run underperformance 
(Ljunqvist, Nanda and Singh, 2003). Ritter (1991) has also studied “hot” issue markets and 
shows that IPOs in the “hot” market of the early 1980s both experienced high underpricing 
in the short run as well as poor performance in the long run. In addition, Loughran and Ritter 
(2000) find strong evidence that IPOs in high-volume periods are more likely to perform 
badly on long term than IPOs in low volume periods (Ljunqvist, Nanda and Singh, 2003).  
There is little empirical literature available on price stabilization in IPOs, as there is little 
available data. De Carvalho and Pinheiro (2008) have however studied stabilization activity 
and find among other things that the intensity of stabilization is negatively related to the 
issue size, while the price range presents a positive relation. However, it is important to note 
that the variables have marginal statistical significance. Boreiko and Lombardo (2009) 
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provided a study of the stabilization activity in the Italian market, and find that stabilized 
IPOs have a low level of initial underpricing after the first day of trading (median equal to -
0,30 %). Non-stabilized IPOs, on the other hand, perform significantly better. 
2.5 “Grey” Markets 
”Grey” markets can be described as a market place where a company’s shares are traded 
unofficially. It is an over-the-counter (OTC) market where a dealer can complete orders for 
their customers and also give support to an issue before it is listed (Kristhnamurti, Thong 
and Vishwanath, 2011). In many cases this happens before an IPO. In this pre-IPO market, 
investors can speculate on future stock prices to companies planning to go public (Cornelli, 
Goldreich and Ljungqvist, 2005). The price in the OTC market is determined by supply and 
demand, and is the price investors are willing to buy or sell in the “grey” market 
(Krishnamurti, Thong and Vishwanath, 2011). In Norway, trading in “grey” markets can 
occur through the Norwegian OTC-market (NOTC). 
Cornelli, Goldreich and Ljungqvist (2005) study the interaction between the “grey” market 
and bookbuilding in terms of determining the offer price. The study is based on data 
collected from a number of European IPOs from 1995 to 2002. As mentioned earlier, the 
underwriter collects information from investors during the bookbuilding period. At the same 
time as this takes place, investors can trade the shares in the “grey” market. The study finds 
that when the prices in the “grey” market are high, they are strongly correlated with the 
prices established in the aftermarket. This can be explained by the fact that when investors 
are overoptimistic, they are willing to pay a price above the true value. On the other hand, 
when they are more pessimistic they price the shares out of the market, and there should be 
no bias to the aftermarket price.  
The prices in the “grey” market are publicly available, and the underwriter can use these 
prices to stipulate the issue price. It is therefore expected to be easier to set a price close to 
market price. Thus, the width of the price range presented in the prospectus is expected to be 
narrower as there is less uncertainty. The width of the price range may indicate the level of 
uncertainty related to an IPO, and one expects a wider range to represent more uncertainty.  
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3. Analysis 
This thesis analyzes the relationship between the final offer price and the initial price range 
established in the pre-IPO phase and the share price performance of companies introduced 
on Oslo Stock Exchange between January 01, 2006 and December 31, 2011. I wish to 
investigate the performance both on short term as well as on longer term, and I will therefore 
analyze the initial return, the return after one week (five trading days) and finally the return 
after six months (129 trading days). By looking at the return after five trading days, one 
might eliminate the effect of potential “stock flippers.”  
The first part of the chapter will present the underlying data, sources and the criteria behind 
the selection. Further, I will explain the method used to calculate abnormal returns, before 
the analysis is presented. In addition to investigate how the IPOs are priced relative to the 
indicative price range and how this affects the performance in the aftermarket, I also wish to 
investigate three factors and how they influence the pricing as well as the performance on 
the short and long term. The analysis has therefore been divided into four sections: 
1) Final offer price relative to the indicative price range 
2) OTC-market 
3) Size of Issue 
4) Green shoe option 
The results will be presented, commented and compared to previous studies mentioned 
earlier in the thesis.  
3.1 Data 
The analysis includes companies that have been introduced on Oslo Stock Exchange 
between 2006 and 2011. According to statistics from Oslo Stock Exchange, 102 companies 
were introduced in the period between January 01, 2006 and August 31, 2008, whereas only 
40 companies were introduced between September 01, 2008 and December 31, 2011, which 
amounts to a total of 142 companies. The final sample includes only those companies that 
were introduced on a stock exchange for the first time and at the same time made an increase 
in share capital or offered a public sale of shares. These limitations reduce the final sample 
to 69 companies, 51 between January 01, 2006 and August 31, 2008 and 18 between 
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September 01, 2008 and December 31, 2011. In addition, the main part of the analysis will 
concentrate on the 48 bookbuilt IPOs in the sample. The chart below presents an overview 
over the data used in the analysis.  
 
The data collection for this thesis has been time consuming. However, DNB Markets has 
provided me with useful data, which have saved me valuable time. The remaining data has 
been collected from prospectuses published in connection with the IPO, Yahoo! Finance, 
Netfonds and statistics obtained from Oslo Stock Exchange. The data received from DNB 
Markets has been checked to make sure that the final data material is correct. I have 
therefore been able to collect all data needed in order to perform the various analyses.  
In this thesis I have chosen to use the share price at the end of the first trading day when 
estimating the initial return. When estimating the return on longer term I have used the price 
after five and 129 trading days. The prices after the first day of trading, five and 129 trading 
days have been obtained from Yahoo! Finance and Netfonds. In the few cases where there 
was no price on the given day I have used the price closest prior to the date. Further on, in 
the analysis of the share price performance, I have used the last subscription date as a 
measure of when an investor buys shares. Information about the last subscription date has 
mainly been taken from the prospectuses. In those cases where the prospectus was not 
available, the information needed could be found in Netfonds’ news archive or in Newsweb, 
provided by Oslo Stock Exchange. In addition, the final offer price was obtained from issue 
statistics provided by Oslo Stock Exchange.  
 27 
In order to analyze the share price performance and determine whether there have been any 
abnormal high or low returns, it is necessary to identify the normal return. This thesis uses 
Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index (OSEBX) as a measure of normal return. According 
to Oslo Stock Exchange, OSEBX is an investible index that comprises the most traded 
shares listed on the stock exchange. It is revised semiannually and is adjusted for dividend 
payments. The historical prices of OSEBX are collected from Yahoo! Finance.  
Information about the indicative price range, deal size and green shoe option were mainly 
obtained from prospectuses, and when the prospectus was not available, the information was 
taken from Netfonds’ news archive or Newsweb. Information whether a green shoe option 
was offered or not proved to be more difficult to find, and I only managed to find 
information about the use of an over-allotment option in 40 of the 48 bookbuilt IPOs in the 
sample. Whether a company was traded in the NOTC-market prior to the listing on Oslo 
Stock Exchange or not could also be found in the listing prospectuses. In addition, the 
Norwegian Securities Dealers Association and Netfonds news archive provided the 
necessary information.  
3.2 Method 
To estimate the abnormal return, both on short and long term, I have used the following 
equation: 
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r
i 
= Abnormal return  
P
i1 
= Stock price at the end of the first day (closing price after five and 129 trading days) 
P
i0 
= Final offer price 
I
i1 
= OSEBX on the day of listing (price after five and 129 trading days) 
I
i0 
= OSEBX on the last subscription date 
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The expressions abnormal and market adjusted return are used synonymous throughout the 
analysis. I will also calculate the return without adjusting for market development in order to 
investigate whether there are any significant differences between these two methods.  
3.2.1 Price relative to indicative price range 
As mentioned earlier, previous studies like Hanley (1993) and Bakke, Leite and Thorburn 
(2011) divided the IPOs into three categories based on where the final offer price was set 
relative to the indicative price range: above, below and within the price range. After the 
issues are categorized, one can see if there are any significant differences in stock price 
return between the various groups.  
However, in my sample only a few issues ended up with the final offer price outside the 
price range, and in those few cases, amended price ranges were made. I have therefore used 
the same method as Samuelsen and Tveter (2006). Instead of three categories, they divided 
their sample into two: below the midpoint of the indicative price range and equal to or above 
the midpoint. In the issues where fixed-price were used they used the indicated price from 
the prospectus instead of the midpoint of the range. In my sample the final offer price was 
set equal to the indicated price in every issue using fixed-price, and I have therefore chosen 
to concentrate on the issues using bookbuilding only, which leads to 48 IPOs. This is done in 
order to investigate whether there is any relationship between where the final offer price is 
set relative to the indicative price range and the performance in the aftermarket.  
Hypothesis 1: I expect issues priced in the upper half of the range to perform better in the 
short term and poorer in the long run than issues priced below the midpoint of the price 
range.  
3.2.2 OTC-market 
The second part of my analysis will investigate how the width of the price range affects the 
share price performance. As stated earlier, one expects the price range to be narrower for 
companies that have been traded in the OTC-market than for those who have not. This is 
also the case in this sample.  
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The average width of the price range for the whole sample was 15 %, whereas the width for 
the OTC-listed and non-OTC-listed was 11 % and 17 % respectively. However, the widest 
range, 56 %, is among the OTC-listed. Despite this, I will in this part of the analysis 
concentrate only on whether or not a company has been listed in the OTC-market.  
A general assumption is that companies previously traded in the OTC-market have less 
asymmetric information and hence less uncertainty, which leads to a more accurate pricing. 
In order to investigate this, I will calculate the average abnormal return using the formula 
presented earlier for the two different groups, OTC-listed and non-OTC-listed. Further, I will 
look at the relationship between a previous listing on the OTC-list and the method used to 
set the price. I will expect that a larger proportion of the OTC-listed IPOs used fixed-price. 
Hypothesis 2: Companies previously traded in the OTC-market experience more accurate 
pricing than companies who have not been traded in this market.   
3.2.3 Size 
The size of the issues varies considerably throughout the final sample of 69 IPOs. The size 
varies from approximately 5 million NOK to nearly 11 billion NOK. It is expected that large 
issues are more accurately priced, and thus yield less abnormal returns. Large issues tend to 
use the bookbuilding method to set the final offer price, and earlier studies find evidence for 
more accurate pricing when using bookbuilding rather than fixed-price. Ranjan and 
Madhusoodanan (2004) find evidence in their study that larger issues used bookbuilding 
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while smaller issues used fixed-price, and according to them, this is why one finds less 
underpricing among bookbuilt IPOs.  
The sample will be divided into two groups representing large and small issues, and the 
abnormal return will be calculated for each group. The sample is right-skewed, which means 
that the majority of the issues are characterized as small issues. Further, I will investigate if 
there is any relationship between the size and where the final offer price is set relative to the 
indicative price range. Finally, I will investigate whether abnormal returns are explained by 
the size of the issue or the method used to set the price. 
Hypothesis 3: Large issues are more accurately priced than small issues.  
3.2.4 Green Shoe Option 
The GSO allows the underwriter to keep fluctuations in post-IPO prices to a minimum. 
“Stock flippers”, who buy a hot IPO with the intent to re-sell immediately to gain profit, 
might cause these price fluctuations. As a tool used to keep the price close to the final offer 
price, one will expect the use of a GSO to lead to a more accurately pricing of the IPO, thus 
less over- and underpricing. Use of a GSO indicates that the IPO was sold with a GSO.  
As mentioned earlier, I only managed to find the necessary information about 40 of the 48 
bookbuilt IPOs in the sample. These 40 will be divided into two groups representing whether 
the IPO was sold with or without a GSO. In addition, the relation between the use of a GSO 
and where in the price range the final offer price is set will also be investigated.  
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Hypothesis 4: The use of a GSO will cause more accurate pricing and thus less abnormal 
returns. 
3.3 Results 
The formula presented above is used to estimate the abnormal return for the three different 
time horizons, initial return and return after five and 129 trading days. The abnormal return 
is both estimated for each of the two time periods separately and for the sample as a whole. 
The results are presented in the table below.  
 
Table 4 indicates that the average abnormal initial return for the 69 companies in the sample 
is equal to 2,41 %. The abnormal initial return is higher in the first period, and is estimated 
to 3,68 %. The second period is actually slightly overpriced on an average basis, and the 
abnormal return is calculated to -0,97 %. However, it is important to note that the estimated 
return for the period between September 01, 2008 and December 31, 2011 is not statistically 
significant, and it might therefore be likely that the results occurred by chance. The sample 
size is also relatively small, containing only 18 IPOs. 
Further, table 4 shows the average market adjusted return after five trading days. For the 
final sample, here including 68 companies due to missing data, the average abnormal return 
is calculated to -1,06 %. The period between January 01, 2006 and August 31, 2008 has an 
abnormal return equal to 1,07 %, while the period September 01, 2008 - December 31, 2011 
shows another picture with an abnormal return equal to -4,60 %. According to the t-statistic, 
only the second period is statistically significant, with a t-value equal to 2,11. 
Finally, the table shows the average abnormal return on a longer term, here after six months 
of trading on Oslo Stock Exchange. The sample as a whole, now 66 companies, has an 
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average market adjusted return estimated to -0,02 %. The first time period still has a positive 
abnormal return, 2,36 %, whereas the second has a negative return, -4,08 %. The t-values for 
both periods were low, and according to a simple t-test, none of the estimated returns were 
statistically significant.  
In addition to calculating the market adjusted return for the different IPOs on short and long 
term, I have also calculated returns without adjusting for market development. The results 
are presented in Appendix 2. Also here I find the same pattern, and the results indicate that 
there are marginal differences between the two methods. Further in this thesis, I will only 
use the market adjusted return. 
A more detailed statistical analysis for the sample as a whole as well as for the bookbuilt 
IPOs has been performed for a closer look at the performance of the IPOs.  
 
The arithmetic mean (average) gives equal weights to each observation and might therefore 
give a wrong picture of the return. Median can provide a more accurate picture. Median is 
defined as the numerical value separating the higher half of the sample from the lower half. 
A median lower than the arithmetic mean and a positive skewness indicates that the sample 
is right-biased. 
The 95 % confidence interval indicates that one with high confidence can say that the initial 
return are positive, and the results are, according to a simple t-test, statistically significant. 
On the other hand, the results for return after one week and after six months are statistically 
insignificant, and the 95 % confidence interval indicates that returns might be negative as 
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well as positive. In theory, standard deviation is an indication of probability, while in 
practice the term has limitations, as returns do not follow a classic “normal distribution.” In 
addition, the standard deviation after six months of trading is high, indicating that the 
individual values are widely spread around the mean value, and leads to a wider confidence 
interval and low t-values (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). The distribution is somewhat skewed, 
and the t-values must be interpreted with this in mind.  
 
The bookbuilt IPOs have a higher average initial return than what was calculated for the 
whole sample, which is inconsistent with previous research that state that bookbuilding leads 
to a more accurately pricing, hence less underpricing. The t-statistic indicates that the results 
are statistically significant only for the initial return. 
Further, I have divided the initial return, return after one week and after 6 months into ten 
intervals to provide an overview of how the IPOs are distributed.  
 
Figure 4 shows that the majority of the IPOs have a positive abnormal initial return, and 
there are no significant differences between the two time periods. Both periods have a high 
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proportion of IPOs within the interval between -2,5 % and 2,5 %, but the companies 
introduced between January 2006 and August 2008 experience more underpricing than those 
introduced between September 2008 and December 2011.  
 
The majority for both time periods is still centered around zero and between the interval -2,5 
% - 2,5 % after five trading days. The distribution has however moved more to the left, and 
the IPOs between January 2006 and August 2008 experience less underpricing after five 
days of trading than what they did after the first day. 
 
After 129 trading days the distribution has been moved even further to the left and the 
majority of the IPOs have a negative abnormal return. However, IPOs in the first time period 
still have a rather high proportion of positive abnormal returns. 
I observe a positive average market adjusted initial return for the IPOs introduced between 
2006 and 2011, which is consistent with previous studies. However, the return is lower than 
earlier observations, and more in line with studies conducted in the recent past. The fact that 
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underpricing is more or less non-existent today has been explained by previous papers to be 
caused by the increasing popularity of bookbuilding, a method that will provide a more 
accurately pricing of an IPO. The majority of the IPOs in my sample used bookbuilding 
when determining the final offer price. However, my results indicate the opposite, that 
bookbuilding does not provide a more accurately pricing of IPOs.  
The positive average returns seem to decline in the longer run, and move towards zero. The 
median after 6 months of trading is calculated to -9,21 %, which means that 50 % of the 
sample has a long term return lower than this. This finding is in line with Ritter (1991), who 
explained that the positive initial return often is followed by a poor performance in the 
longer run. As stated earlier, this might indicate overpricing relative to their true value on 
long-term. 
When comparing January 2006 – August 2008 to September 2008 – December 2011 one can 
see that the IPOs introduced in the first period seem to perform better both on short and long 
term. In addition, the second period seem more vulnerable to fluctuations, and can be linked 
to a higher level of uncertainty. According to Bakke, Leite and Thorburn (2011), the 
probability of a positive initial return is higher when public markets are doing well, as 
investors are more likely to have positive information in good times. This is in line with the 
findings in this analysis. In addition, Ljunqvist, Nanda and Singh (2003) stated that in “cold” 
markets, market rational investors set the prices, and hence no underpricing. This can explain 
why underpricing in the second period is non-existent.  
3.3.1 Price relative to indicative price range 
I have investigated whether there is any relation between where the final offer price is set 
relative to the indicative price range and the share price performance in the aftermarket, as 
earlier studies suggest. The sample was divided into two groups, one where the offer price 
was set equal to or higher than the midpoint of the price range, and one where the offer price 
was set below the midpoint of the range. The differences in the mean values of the two 
groups are greater than what would be expected by chance, thus, there is a statistically 
significant difference between the two groups (t-values equal to 2,56, 2,42 and 3,64). Only 
the 48 IPOs that used bookbuilding to set the final offer price were included in this analysis, 
and the findings are presented in the table below.   
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The results indicate that the return might be affected by where the final offer price is set. 
Issues where the offer price was set on or above the midpoint of the range seem to perform 
better in the aftermarket, both on short and long term. The two periods both show the same 
pattern. It is however important to bear in mind that when looking at the two periods 
separately, the sample size is substantially reduced, and according to a simple t-test I find 
low t-values and few statistically significant results. The statistically significant results are 
marked with a star and can be viewed in table 7. 
The table also shows that the majority of the IPOs end up with an offer price below the 
midpoint of the range, and this applies particularly for the issues between September 2008 
and December 2011 where 12 out of 15 IPOs ended up with an offer price below the 
midpoint. The global financial crisis resulted in a high level of uncertainty in the IPO-
market, and several of the issues completed during the recession needed to amend the price 
range when more information became available during the bookbuilding period. Despite the 
fact that the price range is not legally binding, none of the IPOs ended up with a price 
outside the indicative price range (amended price range). Pricing outside the price range is 
rare in the European markets (Derrien, 2005).  
In addition, I find that 18 of the 48 bookbuilt IPOs ended up with a final offer price exactly 
at the bottom of the range, while eight ended up with a price exactly at the opposite end. Out 
of the 18 issues priced at the bottom of the range, nine took place between September 01, 
2008 and December 31, 2011, while only one of the eight IPOs priced at the top of the range 
took place in this period.  
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A more detailed statistical analysis shows the same results. Apart from initial return for 
issues priced in the upper part of the range, the results are not statistically significant. A 
simple t-test indicates that the results are not significantly different from zero. The t-values 
must be interpreted with caution, as the sample size is small and the distribution is skewed.  
 
 
The fact that issues priced equal to or above the midpoint of the indicative price range 
perform better on short term than issues priced below the midpoint of the range is in 
accordance with Hanley (1993) and hypothesis 1. This might indicate that the underwriter 
has not been able to adjust the issue price high enough relative to the demand of the most 
sought after IPOs. This is known as the “partial adjustment” phenomenon. Negative 
information, on the other hand, is fully incorporated into the offer price as underwriters as 
well as investors want to avoid possible losses on overpriced issues. The issues priced below 
the midpoint of the price range remain more or less constant after the introduction to Oslo 
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Stock Exchange, both on short and long term. On the other hand, issues priced in the upper 
part of the range seem to perform better than issues priced in the opposite end also in the 
longer run. This finding is inconsistent with previous literature, and hypothesis 1, that states 
that “cold” IPOs outperform the benchmark in the medium-run (Bakke, 2012). 
The majority of the issues ended up with an offer price below the midpoint of the price 
range, and this might explain why I find less underpricing than previous studies. Also the 
fact that 80 % of the IPOs introduced between September 01, 2008 and December 31, 2011 
were priced in the lower end of the range can help explain why I find less underpricing 
during the recession than in the period between January 01, 2006 and August 31, 2008, 
where 58 % of the IPOs ended up with a price below the midpoint of the price range.  
3.3.2 OTC-market 
When investigating the effect of the OTC-market and the width of the price range, I divided 
the sample into two groups representing whether they have been listed in the “grey” market 
or not. However, I find low t-values and no statistically significant difference between the 
two sample groups. This is no surprise as the difference between them is relatively small. 
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The results indicate that the arithmetic mean is more or less equal for both groups. However, 
the non-OTC issues have a higher standard deviation on short term, which indicates that the 
returns are spread out over a large range of values. A low standard deviation on the other 
hand means that the returns tend to be closer to the mean, and this is the case for the OTC-
issues on short term. The fact that there is less fluctuation among the OTC-traded IPOs is 
more in line with hypothesis 2. An IPO that has been traded in the “grey” market prior to the 
listing on a stock exchange has been able to establish a price, and therefore one would expect 
less uncertainty around the pricing. Except from initial return for OTC-listed IPOs, none of 
the results are statistically significant.  
When investigating the relationship between the OTC-listed IPOs and the method used to set 
the IPO price, I find that 53 % of the IPOs using fixed-price have previously been traded in 
the OTC marked, while only 31 % of the bookbuilt IPOs have been traded in this market. 
Among those using bookbuilding, I found no relation between a previously listing in the 
“grey” market and where in the price range the final offer price was set.  
3.3.3 Size 
Since the IPOs on Oslo Stock Exchange varies substantially in size it might be of interest to 
investigate whether this has any influence on the price setting and the performance in the 
aftermarket. The sample has been divided into large and small issues. However, a simple t-
test suggests that small and large issues are not statistically different from each other. 
Dividing the sample was relatively difficult, and this can help explain why I find no 
significant difference between the two groups. Small issues dominate the Norwegian IPO-
market; hence, the group with small issues is larger in scale.  
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The statistical analysis indicates that the large issues have lower standard deviation than the 
small issues on short term, which might be a sign of a more accurately pricing of large issues 
and thus less fluctuation in the price after the introduction. This is consistent with hypothesis 
3. Nevertheless, as the table suggests, there are no statistically significant results on a 5 % 
significance level.  
When looking at the relationship between the issue size and the position of the offer price in 
the indicative price range, I find that small issues are more frequently priced below the 
midpoint of the range than large issues.  
In order to investigate whether abnormal returns are explained by the size or the pricing 
method, I calculated abnormal returns for fixed-price IPOs, and compared the results to the 
bookbuilt IPOs from table 6. IPOs using bookbuilding seem to be significantly different 
from those using fixed-price.  
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Table 6 and 12 imply that bookbuilt IPOs experience more fluctuations both on short and 
long term than fixed-price IPOs, which is inconsistent with previous research that states that 
bookbuilding results in more accurate pricing. Nevertheless, few of the results are 
statistically significant. Every IPO in the sample using fixed-price is characterized as a small 
issue, whereas the bookbuilt IPOs are more or less equally divided between small and large 
issues. This finding is consistent with Ranjan and Madhusoodanan (2004) who stated that 
small issues have a tendency to use fixed-price. Large bookbuilt IPOs seem to be more 
accurately priced than small bookbuilt IPOs. 
Overall, the bookbuilt IPOs in this sample are not more accurately priced than the fixed-
price IPOs, hence, this does not give an explanation for less underpricing today. The size of 
the issue, on the other hand, seems to have a greater impact on the performance in the 
aftermarket.  
3.3.4 Green Shoe Option 
A green shoe option is a tool that can provide additional price stability as it gives the 
underwriter the right to increase supply and in that way smooth out price fluctuations if 
demand surges. In order to examine whether the GSO works as a stabilizer I have divided 
the sample into two groups and calculated the abnormal return for each group both on short 
and long term. The results are presented in table 13. When investigating the difference 
between the two groups I find relatively low t-values suggesting that there is no statistically 
significant difference.  
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The results indicate that there is no clear relation between whether the IPO was sold with or 
without a GSO and the performance in the aftermarket as hypothesis 4 suggested.  
These results are interesting and also somewhat surprising. An IPO sold with a GSO can 
only start the stabilization process after the stock starts trading on the stock exchange, and 
the stabilizing agent will decide whether to exercise the option or not based on demand in the 
market. When demand is high, and the aftermarket price is higher than the offer price, the 
underwriter will exercise the option. When demand is low the option will not be exercised. 
Based on this discussion, one would expect to see a more stable price development in IPOs 
sold with a GSO.  
It is important to note that the results, except from initial return for IPOs sold with a GSO, 
are not statistically significant. The sample size is relatively small, containing only 40 
bookbuilt IPOs.  
The IPOs that were sold without a GSO tend to be more frequently priced below the 
midpoint of the indicative price range, and as many as 87 % of the IPOs with no GSO were 
priced in the lower half of the range.  This might be explained by the fact that more IPOs 
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were sold without a GSO between September 01, 2008 and December 31, 2011 when the 
IPO market was filled with uncertainty due to the global financial crisis. The IPOs sold with 
a GSO was priced equal to or above the price range in 56 % of the cases. I have divided the 
GSO IPOs into two groups representing where in the range the final offer price was set in 
order to examine the performance in the aftermarket.  
 
Again, one can see that the IPOs including a GSO priced equal to or above the midpoint of 
the indicative price range perform better, both on short and long term, than those priced 
below the midpoint. The results are not statistically significant according to the t-statistics.  
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4 Regression Analysis 
This thesis examines the relationship between the indicative price range established in the 
pre-IPO phase and the final offer price. In this chapter I will take a closer look on how the 
pricing of IPOs relative to the indicative price range prior to the listing (hypothesis 1) can 
help explain their performance on Oslo Stock Exchange between 2006 and 2011. This is 
done using regression analysis. Regression analysis analyses several variables, and the focus 
is the relationship between a dependent variable and one or more independent variables. I 
will first describe the variables I found most suitable to examine the hypothesis before a few 
regression models are presented. The findings will be commented. The chapter ends with a 
critical review of the regression models.  
4.1 Variables 
I have chosen to use two explanatory variables. One that states whether the offer price was 
set equal to or above the midpoint of the indicative price range, and one that takes into 
account the price revision. I have also included nine control variables. In order to investigate 
the relationship between each of these factors and the share price performance, I have chosen 
a variable that I find suitable for this purpose.  
I have chosen to use “Ordinary Least Squares” (OLS) as an analytical tool. This method 
minimizes the sum of squared vertical distances between the observed responses in the 
sample and the responses predicted by the linear approximation. Four assumptions need to 
be hold in order for the regressions to be “Best Linear Unbiased Estimators”, BLUE, with 
the smallest variance among the class of alternative linear unbiased estimators. 
1: The errors have zero mean, E(ui) = 0 
2: The variance of the errors is constant and finite over all values of Xi: Var(ui) = σ2 < ∞ 
(homoscedasticity) 
3: The errors are statistically independent of one another: Cov(ui,uj) = 0 for i ≠ j (no 
autocorrelation) 
4: There is no relationship between the error and the corresponding X variate: Cov(ui,Xi) = 0 
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(Gujarati and Porter, 2009).  
Violation of the second assumption is called heteroscedasticity, and the OLS estimators will 
no longer be efficient, or the “best”. When heteroscedasticity is present, the OLS estimators 
remain unbiased and consistent. Violation of assumption number three is known as 
Autocorrelation, and the consequence of this is equal to heteroscedasticity, which means that 
OLS no longer provides the best estimate. The OLS estimate remains unbiased. Violation of 
the last assumption creates more severe consequences as the estimates provided by OLS get 
biased (Gujarati and Porter, 2009).  
Next, I will present the response variables, the two explanatory variables, followed by a 
short presentation of the control variables. Unless otherwise stated, a significance level of 5 
% (α = 0,05) will be used.  
4.1.1 Abnormal Returns 
Market adjusted returns are calculated using the formula from chapter 3.2, and the variable is 
called abnormal return. The returns are log adjusted in order to fulfill the normal distribution 
to a greater extent.  
4.1.2 Price relative to indicative price range 
The first hypothesis examines the relationship between where the final offer price is set in 
the indicative price range and the share price performance. I expect to find that IPOs priced 
equal to or above the midpoint of the range perform better in the aftermarket than IPOs 
priced below the midpoint of the range. Bakke, Leite and Thorburn (2011) introduced three 
dummy variables that indicated whether the final offer price was set within the price range or 
outside (above or below). In my case I will only use one dummy variable that indicates 
whether the final offer price was set equal to or above the midpoint of the range (1) or below 
the midpoint (0). I have called the dummy variable PriceRangehds (high demand state). 
Only the bookbuilt IPOs are included in this analysis. 
4.1.3 Percentage change in issue price 
To take into account the “Partial Adjustment” phenomenon (see chapter 2.3) a PriceRevision 
variable has been included. This variable is defined as the percentage difference between the 
final offer price P0 and the expected issue price, PE (midpoint of the indicative price range).  
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Formula: (P0 - PE) / PE  
This variable can be seen as a proxy for the private information that the underwriter obtains 
during the bookbuilding period prior to the listing. I will expect to find that the final offer 
price is only partially adjusted relative to private information learned during the 
bookbuilding. Again, only the bookbuilt IPOs are included. 
4.1.4 Control Variables 
Here follows a brief review of the nine control variables that are included in the regression 
analysis in order to distinguish possible effects that might influence the performance in the 
aftermarket.  
1. Underwriter: Earlier studies have documented differences in how an issue performs in 
the aftermarket between IPOs that have used different underwriters. I have therefore 
included six dummy variables each representing an investment bank. I have chosen the six 
investment banks with the most IPOs in the period: DNB Markets, First Securities, Pareto 
Securities, SEB Enskilda, ABG Sundal Collier and Carnegie. The variables are named the 
following: DNB, First, Pareto, SEB, ABG and Carnegie. 
2. Age: Another factor that has proven to affect share price performance is the age of the 
company at the time of introduction to a stock exchange (Loughran and Ritter, 2002). 
Companies that have lasted longer might be easier to value as more information is available. 
I will use the variable Age, which represents the number of years between the founding of 
the company and the IPO.  
3. Periodical trends: Since the time periods in the sample (2006 – August 2008 and 
September 2008 – 2011) represent two different market conditions it might be appropriate to 
introduce variables that take periodical trends into account. One indicator variable, 
listed06_aug08, is therefore introduced. 
4. Market Return: Previous studies indicate that the market return prior to the listing has a 
positive impact on the IPO returns. I have therefore added a control variable that takes the 
return on OSEBX during the 30 trading days prior to the listing into account. This variable 
can be seen as a proxy for the publicly available information. 
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4.1.5 Presentation of the Regression Model 
I will perform four different regression analyses. The first only takes into account the first 
explanatory variable, PriceRangehds, whereas the second in addition includes the control 
variables that provide the strongest explanatory power. The third analysis examines the 
PriceRevision variable, while the fourth, and final analysis, includes the suitable control 
variables. 
Abnormal return = β0 + β1PriceRangehds +β2PriceRevision + β3DNB + β4First + β5Pareto 
+ β6SEB + β7ABG + β8Carnegie +β9Age + β10Listed06_aug08 + β11LogMarketReturn + ei 
Where 
β0: A constant amount 
X: Explanatory variables 
βi: The effect on IPO return (the coefficient of the variable X) 
ei: The “noise” term reflecting other factors that influence the return  
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Regression 1 
This first regression model was performed with only PriceRangehds as an explanatory 
variable. This gave the following model: 
Abnormal return = β0 + β1PriceRangehds + ei 
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The table shows that when I only include PriceRangehds as an explanatory variable the t-
value is equal to 1,26, 1,14 and 1,87 for the three time horizons respectively. The coefficient 
β1 is equal to 0,014, 0,015 and 0,08 respectively, and indicates the effect on IPO return of a 
price set equal to or above the midpoint of the indicative price range. This coefficient 
measures the change in the mean value of abnormal return per unit change in 
PriceRangehds, holding everything else constant. The coefficient is positive for each of the 
time horizons, and indicates that when the offer price is set in the upper part of the range, the 
IPO perform better both on short and longer term. In addition, the results show that if 
everything else is held constant, the average return will decline with time. As discussed 
earlier, that IPOs priced equal to or above the midpoint of the initial price range perform 
better on short term are in line with previous studies. The fact that they also perform better in 
the longer run are inconsistent with earlier empirical findings.  
The R2 values are relatively low (3,33 %, 2,75 % and 7,49 % respectively). R2 is a statistical 
term saying how good one term is at predicting another. There are however problems with 
this term, and one important weakness is the fact that R2 rise as more variables are added to 
the regression. When adding more variables to the model one may also increase the variance 
of forecast error (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). R2 is therefore not a very good measure of how 
good a regression model is, and it is more interesting to take a closer look at statistically 
significance and the coefficient. Only the return after six months of trading is significant on a 
10 % significance level, which can be explained by the fact that the sample size is relatively 
small.  
4.2.2 Regression 2 
In this section I have tried various combinations of the explanatory variable, PriceRangehds, 
and the various control variables. Two variables, age and listed06_aug08, contributed to a 
limited extent, and were thus omitted. This gave the following model: 
Abnormal return = β0 + β1PriceRangehds + β2DNB + β3First + 54Pareto + β5SEB + 
β6ABG + β7Carnegie + β8LogMarketReturn + ei 
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The model with the highest R2 (20,15 %, 16,07 % and 26,65 % respectively) is, naturally, 
the one where both the six indicator variables representing different underwriters and the log 
adjusted market return are included. There are few significant results. The explanatory 
variable, PriceRangehds, is statistically significant after six months of trading on 15 % (and 
5 %) significance level in every regression presented above. In addition, the control variable, 
Logmarketreturn, is significant on a 10 % significance level after five days of trading in the 
third regression. This indicates that the underwriter does not take the performance of the 
market prior to the listing fully into account when pricing the issue. This finding is 
consistent with Loughran and Ritter (2000, referred to in Lowry and Schwert 2001) who find 
that both private and public information are only partially incorporated into the final issue 
price. In addition, Bakke, Leite and Thorburn (2011) find in their study that this finding also 
is in line with Benveniste and Spindt (1989), as explained in chapter 2.3. The three different 
parameter estimates in the table represent the three different time horizons, the return after 
one, five and 129 trading days. 
The two coefficients, β1 and β8, have positive values in every regression as well as for each 
of the time horizons. Out of the six different underwriters, only First Securities and DNB 
Markets seem to contribute with significant explanatory power (p-values below 0,10 in most 
cases). 
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4.2.3 Regression 3 
The third analysis was performed with only the variable PriceRevision, which gave the 
following model: 
Abnormal return = β0 + β1PriceRevision + ei 
 
In the table above one can see that PriceRevision has a positive coefficient and a t-value 
equal to 1,63, which indicates that the result is significant on a 10 % significance level. This 
may suggest that a change in the issue price relative to the expected issue price to a certain 
degree can predict the initial return. The regression indicates a positive correlation between a 
price revision and the initial return of an IPO. According to the results, if the final offer price 
is set 10 % higher than the expected offer price, the initial return will be 0,62 % higher. 
These findings are in line with earlier studies presented above that state that positive 
revisions are usually followed by a positive first-day return. This can be explained by the 
fact that the underwriter only partially incorporates the positive private information learned 
during the bookbuilding period when they decide on the final offer price.  
4.2.4 Regression 4 
The fourth and final part contains various combinations of the PriceRevision variable and the 
nine different control variables presented above.  
Abnormal return = β0 + +β1PriceRevision + β2DNB + β3First + 54Pareto + β5SEB + 
β6ABG + β7Carnegie +β8Age + β9Listed06_aug08 + β10LogMarketReturn + ei 
The results are presented in the table below. 
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The variable listed06_aug08 contributed only to a limited extent, and was therefore omitted. 
The indicator variables representing each of the six underwriters seemed to have the largest 
impact on the regression. The coefficient for age is equal to zero, and indicates neither a 
positive nor negative effect on the return. However, the inclusion of this variable influenced 
the other variables to a large extent, and was therefore kept in the model.  
There are few statistically significant results in the various models, and only the constant 
(β0) seems to be statistically significant on a 5 % (15 %) significance level. The coefficients 
are still positive and suggest a positive effect on the initial returns. Among the six 
underwriters, DNB Markets seems to be the only one to contribute with significant 
explanatory power with p-values below 0,10 in every case.   
4.3 Critical Review 
As mentioned earlier, the OLS model relies on several assumptions. This section will discuss 
whether my regression models satisfy these assumptions. The various test results can be 
viewed in Appendix 3.  
When using OLS there is a requirement of normality in the residuals, and I have therefore 
performed a Shapiro-Wilk (SW) normality test. According to the SW-test the log adjusted 
returns after one and five trading days are not normally distributed. The p-values were equal 
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to 0,003 and 0,000 respectively, which indicates that the null hypotheses (the data are 
normally distributed) are rejected.  
Another assumption in the OLS model is that the disturbance ui appearing in the regression 
function is homoscestatic, which means that they all have the same variance. There are 
several reasons to why the variances may be variable (heteroscedasticity). One reason is the 
presence of outliers, which is an observation that much differs in relation to other 
observations in the sample. Other reasons are measurement errors and skewness in variables. 
When heteroscedasticity is present, the confidence interval becomes wider. The consequence 
may be that significant results become insignificant due to low t-values (Gujarati and Porter, 
2009). There are several tests that can help detect heteroscedasticity, and in this thesis I have 
used White’s test, which involves regressing the squared error term from the OLS regression 
on the independent variables in the regression. As the Chi-square value obtained from the 
test, in most cases, exceeds the critical Chi-square value at a 5 % significance level, it seems 
like heteroscedasticity is present.  
Autocorrelation is defined as a violation of the assumption that the errors in the regression 
are uncorrelated and independent. Reasons for autocorrelation might for example be model 
misspecification or data manipulation. The problems associated with autocorrelation are 
similar to those caused by heteroscedasticity. The simplest test for autocorrelation is the 
Durbin-Watson (DW) test. A two-sided test with 5 % significance level suggests that I might 
have problems with positive autocorrelation in some of the regressions. 
Multicollinearity is a statistical phenomenon where two or more variables in a regression 
model are highly correlated. This might cause dramatic changes in the coefficient in 
response to small changes in the model or the data material. Perfect multicollinearity will 
never be an issue in real life data, however one might experience near perfect 
multicollinearity. An often-used measure to detect this problem is the Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF). It is however important to note that the VIF-value is not a test, but an indicator 
of multicollinearity. A rule of thumb is that VIF-values above 10 indicate severe 
multicollinearity (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). As none of the VIF values exceeds 10, I can 
conclude that multicollinearity is not a problem.  
A final important assumption is that the regression model is “correctly” specified. If this is 
not the case, we encounter the problem of specification error or specification bias. Among 
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other things, it is likely that one commit one or more of the following specification errors: 
Inclusion of irrelevant variables, omission of necessary variables, wrong functional form and 
measurement errors (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). It could, for example, have been beneficial 
to include variables for a previous listing in the OTC-market, whether the IPO was sold with 
or without a GSO and the size of the issue, which I examined in chapter 3. Choosing the 
correct variables has been both time-consuming and difficult. In addition, the sample size is 
relatively small, and therefore the results should be interpreted as an indication and not as a 
fact.  
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5 Conclusion 
The analysis of the initial return shows a positive market adjusted return for the IPOs on 
Oslo Stock Exchange between 2006 and 2011. This finding is in line with previous studies, 
although the average abnormal initial return is significantly lower than previous findings. I 
also find a higher initial return for IPOs introduced between January 01, 2006 and August 
31, 2008 than for the issues completed between September 01, 2008 and December 31, 2011. 
Further, I find the positive average return to decline in the longer run, which also is in line 
with previous studies (Ritter, 1991).  
When investigating where the final offer price was set relative to the indicative price range 
and how this affected the share price development I find that the IPOs in the sample most 
frequently was priced in the lower part. This is especially true for the issues between 
September 01, 2008 and December 31, 2011. Further on, I observe that small bookbuilt IPOs 
and IPOs sold without a GSO more frequently were priced in the lower part of the indicative 
price range. My results show that 18 of the IPOs in the sample were priced exactly at the 
bottom of the range, while eight were priced exactly at the top. My results also indicate that 
the performance in the aftermarket is affected by where in the range the offer price is set. 
These findings are consistent with previous studies.3 I find that IPOs priced equal to or 
above the midpoint of the range perform better both on short and long term. The fact that 
they perform better in the longer run is inconsistent with previous empirical evidence 
(Bakke, 2012).  
The different regression analyses suggest that both private and public information are only 
partially incorporated into the final offer price. 
The regression analyses indicate that when the offer price is set in the upper part of the 
range, the IPO perform better. This finding is partially in line with previous studies. When I 
included a control variable for market return, my findings suggest that the underwriter does 
not fully take into account the market situation in the period prior to the listing when pricing 
the issue. This finding is according to Bakke, Leite and Thorburn (2011), who in their study 
find that this is both theoretical and empirical consistent with the Benveniste and Spindt 
                                                
3 For example Bakke, Leite and Thorburn, 2011 - ”Public Information and IPO Underpricing”. 
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(1989) framework. In addition, Loughran and Ritter (2000)4 find that both public and private 
information are only partially incorporated into the issue price.  
Further on, I find a positive correlation between a price revision and the return after the first 
day of trading. As mentioned in chapter 2, previous studies suggest that a positive revision is 
followed by a positive initial return. This can be interpreted as indications that the 
underwriter only partially incorporates the positive private information learned during the 
bookbuilding period. This is in line with the partial adjustment theory presented in chapter 2, 
which states that private information from investors is only partially incorporated into the 
final offer price.   
In addition, my results indicate that IPOs previously traded in the OTC-market as well as 
large issues tend to have a lower standard deviation, which means that the returns are 
centered around the mean. Every IPO that used fixed-price when setting the price is 
characterized as a small issue, whereas bookbuilding is both used among large and small 
issues. Further on, my results suggest that bookbuilding does not provide a more accurate 
pricing, as one would expect. I also investigated the relationship between a previous listing 
in the OTC-market and method used to set the offer price, and my findings suggest that 
fixed-price is more often used among former OTC-listed companies. Surprisingly, I find no 
clear relation between whether an issue was sold with or without a GSO and the performance 
in the aftermarket.  
Due to the small sample size it is impossible to draw any clear conclusions based on the 
various analyses. However, most of the findings are in line with previous studies presented 
earlier and in line with the model presented by Benveniste and Spindt in 1989.  
 
                                                
4 Referred to in Lowry and Schwert, 2001 
 56 
Tables: 
Table 1: Percentage of IPOs relative to indicative price range……………………………...14 
Table 2: Average first-day returns relative to indicative price range………….…………….14 
Table 3: International evidence on long-run performance of IPOs………………………….21 
Table 4: Average market adjusted return……………………………………………………30 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics (whole sample)………………………………………………31 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics (bookbuilt IPOs)………………………………………….....32 
Table 7: Price relative to indicative price range and performance in the aftermarket..…......35 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics – Offer price ≥ Midpoint………………………………...….36 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics – Offer price < Midpoint…………………………………....36 
Table 10: Descriptive statistics – OTC……………………………………………………...37 
Table 11: Descriptive statistics – Issue size………………………………………………....38 
Table 12: Abnormal return for Fixed-Price IPOs……………………………………….......39 
Table 13: Descriptive statistics – Green Shoe Option………………………………………40 
Table 14: Descriptive statistics – Price relative to price range (IPOs with GSO)…………..41 
Table 15: Results obtained from regression 1……………………………………………….47 
Table 16: Results obtained from regression 2……………………………………………….48 
Table 17: Results obtained from regression 3……………………………………………….49 
Table 18: Results obtained from regression 4……………………………………………….49 
 
 57 
Figures 
Figure 1: OSEBX 2006 – 2011……………………………………………………………4 
Figure 2: Overview of data………………………………………………………………..25 
Figure 3: Differences between OTC and non-OTC IPOs…………………………………28 
Figure 4: Overview of the use of Green Shoe Option……………………………………..30 
Figure 5: Distribution of initial return in percent………………………………………….33 
Figure 6: Distribution of return after one week…………………………………………....33 
Figure 7: Distribution of return after six months…………………………………………..34 
 58 
References 
Bakke, E. (2012) Cold' IPOs or Hidden Gems? On the Medium-Run Performance of IPOs. 
Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2018808 Downloaded June 5, 2012 
Bakke, E., Leite, T. and Thorburn, K. S. (2011) Public information and IPO underpricing. 
ECGI Working paper series in Finance, N°. 322/2011 
Benveniste, L.M. and P.A. Spindt (1989) How investment bankers determine the offer price 
and allocation of new issues, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 11, No. 1. 
Berk, J., and DeMarzo, P. (2011) Corporate Finance 2nd ed. Global edition. Pearson 
Education Limited 
Biais, B. and A.M. Faugeron-Crouzet (2002) IPO auctions: English, Dutch,… French and 
Internet. Journal of Financial Intermediation 11, 9-36 
Boreiko, D. and Lombardo, S. (2009) Stabilization Activity in Italian IPOs. ECGI - Finance 
Working Paper No. 270/2009.  
de Carvalho, A. G. and Pinheiro, D. B. (2008) Determinants of Stabilization in Initial Public 
Offerings. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1140800 Downloaded March 8, 2012 
Chemmanur, T., He, S. and Nandy, D. (2009) The Going Public Decision and the Product 
Market. Working Papers. Available from: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=674241 Downloaded January 25, 2012 
Cornelli, F. and D. Goldreich (2000) Bookbuilding and Strategic Allocation. IFA Working 
paper No. 286-1999 
Cornelli, F. and D. Goldreich (2001) Bookbuilding: How informative is the order book? 
Working paper, Utah 2001 Conference; AFA 2001 New Orleans; EFA 2000 London 
Meeting 
Cowie, D. (February 25, 2008) ECM teams see “fishing” as threat to their role. Available 
from: http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2008-02-25/ecm-teams-see-as-threat-to-their-
role-1 Downloaded February 28, 2012 
 59 
Demers, E. A. and Lewellen, K. (2001) The Marketing Role of IPOs: Evidence from Internet 
Stocks. Simon School of Business Working Paper No. FR 01-15. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=281749  
Derrien, F. (2005) IPO Pricing in 'Hot' Market Conditions: Who Leaves Money on the 
Table? Journal of Finance, Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 487-521. 
Dong, M. and Michel, J-S. (2009) Does Investor Heterogeneity Lead to IPO Overvaluation? 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1364059 Downloaded March 5, 2012 
Draho, J. (2004) The IPO decision: Why and how companies go public. Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited 
Giudici, G. and Roosenboom, P. (2002) Pricing Initial Public Offerings on “New” 
European Stock Markets. Working Paper Series. EFMA 2002 London Meetings. Available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=314275 Downloaded January 25, 2012 
Gondat-Larralde, C. and James, K. R. (2008) IPO Pricing and Share Allocation: The 
Importance of Being Ignorant.  Journal of Finance, Vol. LXIII, NO. 1, February 2008. 
Gretland, B. (1997) Børsintroduksjoner, verdsettelse og prisfastsettelse Verdsettelse i teori 
og praksis, Knut Boye. 
Gujarti, D. N. and Porter, D. C. (2009) Basic Econometrics 5th ed. International Edition. 
McGraw Hill, Higher Education 
Hamilton, L. C. (2006) Statistics with STATA. Thomson Brooks/Cole 
Hanley, K. W. (1993) The underpricing of initial public offerings and the partial adjustment 
phenomenon. Journal of Financial Economics 34 (1993) 231 – 250. North-Holland.  
IFR – IPO Roundtable, December 2011 http://edition.pagesuite-
professional.co.uk/launch.aspx?referral=other&pnum=3&refresh=A0g3q71EGa61&EID=65
38df94-294f-48a8-ae5d-f9ec60aae29b&skip=&p=3 Downloaded January 10, 2012 
Jaffe, J. F., and Ibbotson, R. G. (1975) ”Hot Issue” Markets. University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign's Academy for Entrepreneurial Leadership Historical Research 
Reference in Entrepreneurship 
 60 
Jenkinson, T., and Jones, H. (2002) Bids and Allocations in European IPO Bookbuilding 
Working paper series, AFA 2003 Washington, DC Meetings 
Jenkinson, T., and A, Ljungqvist (2001) Going Public: The Theory and Evidence on How 
Companies Raise Equity. Finance Oxford University Press 
Krishnamurti, C., Thong, T. Y. and Ramanna, V. (2011) Grey Market for Indian IPOs: 
Investor Sentiment and After-Market Performance. Financial Markets & Corporate 
Governance Conference.  
Leite, T. (2007) Adverse Selection, Public Information, and Underpricing in IPOs. Journal 
of Corporate Finance 13(5), 2007, 813-828.  
Ljungqvist, A., Singh, R. and Nanda, V. K., (2003) Hot Markets, Investor Sentiment, and 
IPO Pricing. AFA 2004 San Diego Meetings; Twelfth Annual Utah Winter Finance 
Conference; Texas Finance Festival.  
Ljungqvist, A. (2004) IPO Underpricing. Handbooks in Finance: Empirical Corporate 
Finance, Chapter III.4. 
Ljungqvist, A., Cornelli, F. and Goldreich, D. (2005) Investor Sentiment and Pre-IPO 
Markets. AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings; EFA 2005 Moscow Meetings Paper. Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=548683 Downloaded February 28, 2012 
Loughran, T. and Ritter J. R. (2002) Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time? AFA 
2003 Washington, DC Meetings. Available from SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=331780 
Downloaded January 25, 2012 
Lowry, M., and Schwert, G. M. (2001) Biases in the IPO Pricing Process. The Bradley 
Policy Research Center, Financial Research and Policy, Working Paper No. FR 01-02 
Lowry, M., and Schwert, G. M. (2003) Is the IPO pricing process eficcient? Journal of 
Financial Economics 71 (2004) 3 – 26 
Netfonds Market Quotes http://www.netfonds.no/quotes/market.php  
Newsweb http://www.newsweb.no/newsweb/search.do?siteLanguage=en  
Norwegian Securities Dealer Association: http://www.nfmf.no/Norwegian/OTC-
 61 
listen/Hvordan_OTC-listen_fungerer_og_reguleres/ Downloaded February 20, 2012 
Oslo Stock Exchange: The difference between Oslo Børs and Oslo Axess 
http://www.oslobors.no/ob_eng/Oslo-Boers/Listing/Shares-equity-certificates-and-rights-to-
shares/The-difference-between-Oslo-Boers-and-Oslo-Axess 
Oslo Stock Exchange: Issues Statistics (Oslo Børs and Oslo Axess) 
http://www.oslobors.no/ob_eng/Oslo-Boers/Statistics/Issues-statistics Downloaded February 
17, 2012 
Pevalin, D. and Robson, K. (2009) The stata survival manual. McGraw-Hill Education 
Ranjan, N. and Madhusoodanan, T.P. (2004) IPO underpricing, Issue Mechanisms, and Size. 
Working Paper Series. Available from: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=520744 Downloaded April 27, 2012 
Ritter, J. R., (1991) The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings. Journal of 
Finance, 46, 3-27. 
Ritter, J. R. (1998) Initial Public Offerings. Contemporary Finance Digest Vol. 2, No. 1 
(Spring 1998), pp. 5 – 30 
Ritter, J. R. (2003) Differences between European and American IPO markets. European 
Financial Management Vo. 9, No. 4 (December 2003), pp. 421 – 434 
Ritter, J. R. (2009) Some Factoids about the 2008 IPO market. Available from 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/IPOs2008Factoids.pdf Downloaded March 6, 2012 
Samuelsen, A. and Tveter, L. K. (2006) Børsintroduksjoner: Prising av norske 
børsintroduksjoner med vekt på oljerelaterte selskaper. Master thesis Norwegian School of 
Economics 
Nærland, M. (1994) Børsintroduksjoner og rettede emisjoner. SNF-Report, 74/94.  
Sherman, A. E. and Titman, S. (2000) Building the IPO order book: Underpricing and 
participation limits with costly information. Journal of Financial Economics 65 (2002) 3 – 
29 
 62 
Shiller, R. J. (1990) Speculative Prices and Popular Models. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 4, No. 2. (Spring, 1990), pp. 55 – 65 
Yahoo! Finance http://finance.yahoo.com/  
Welch, I. and Ritter, J. (2002) A review of IPO activity, pricing and allocations. Yale ICF 
Working Paper No. 02 - 01 
 
 
 
 63 
Appendix 
Appendix 1 
Overview of data: Market adjusted returns, price range, final offer price (IPO price), previous OTC 
listing, size and use of Green Shoe Option 
Issuer 
Price 
Range 
 Low 
Price 
Range 
 High 
IPO 
price 
Abnormal  
Initial 
Returns 
Abnormal 
five  
day 
returns 
Abnormal 
six 
 month 
Returns OTC 
Issue 
Size GSO 
Block Watne Gruppen ASA 28,00 33,00 33,00 9,82 3,36 15,19 NO Large YES 
SeaBird Exploration Ltd. 16,00 20,00 20,00 29,25 30,79 69,17 NO Small YES 
Dolphin Interconnect Solutions 
ASA 17,50 17,50 17,50 13,36 4,05 -15,60 YES Small YES 
Renewable Energy Corporation 
ASA 69,00 88,00 95,00* 22,11 -0,39 12,80 NO Large NO 
Petrojarl ASA (Teekay Petrojarl 
ASA) 37,00 47,00 43,00 -5,16 -25,01 44,74 NO Large YES 
Ability Group ASA 45,00 53,00 47,00 -4,61 -5,67 -5,35 NO Large YES 
Trolltech ASA 14,00 20,00 16,00 10,71 26,82 -11,57 NO Small YES 
Clavis Pharma ASA 45,50 45,50 45,50 -0,33 -2,10 -15,00 NO Small NA 
Austevoll Seafood ASA 38,00 43,00 39,00 0,14 -6,11 16,54 YES Large NA 
Marine Farms ASA 14,00 14,00 14,00 -3,57 -8,11 24,19 YES Small NO 
Codfarmers ASA 21,00 26,00 26,00 -8,29 -7,94 -3,18 NO Small YES 
Eitzen Chemical ASA 27,60 31,50 28,00 -6,37 -13,05 -34,57 YES Large NA 
AKVA group ASA 33,00 40,00 35,00 0,01 -2,92 17,05 NO Small NO 
Det norske oljeselskap ASA (Ex. 
Petra) 60,00 60,00 60,00 2,49 2,59 -44,46 YES Small NO 
Norwegian Property ASA 50,00 55,00 53,50 6,28 6,17 31,94 YES Large YES 
Faktor Eiendom ASA 34,00 42,00 35,00 -3,70 -8,20 -34,00 NO Large NO 
Spits ASA 20,00 23,00 16,00* -1,08 -5,82 -17,52 NO Small NA 
NEAS ASA 33,00 41 33,00 -4,34 -3,68 -22,85 NO Small NO 
Algeta ASA 41,00 51,00 47,00 -5,01 -3,73 -18,05 NO Small YES 
Electromagnetic Geoservices ASA 100,00 135,00 135,00* 7,94 -0,77 -38,93 NO Large YES 
Nexus Floating Production Ltd 68,00 74,00 71,00 1,63 -0,40 -11,17 YES Small NO 
Wavefield Inseis ASA 37,00 44,00 44,00 7,24 7,35 45,26 YES Large NA 
Rem Offshore ASA 38,00 44,00 40,00 3,89 27,13 25,34 NO Small NA 
SalMar ASA 39,00 39,00 39,00 0,13 0,68 -1,16 NO Small NO 
ScanArc ASA 33,00 42,00 40,00 6,34 5,84 -19,69 NO Large YES 
Fred. Olsen Production ASA 25,50 28,00 26,00 5,09 -5,56 -14,20 YES Small NA 
Bouvet ASA 40,00 46,00 40,00 -1,40 -5,80 54,74 NO Small YES 
Maritime Industrial Services Co 
Ltd. Inc 30,00 30,00 30,00 2,07 14,74 -9,81 YES Small NO 
Protector Forsikring ASA 14,00 14,00 14,00 4,51 0,70 -29,36 YES Small NA 
Arrow Seismic ASA 65,00 73,00 70,00 1,82 0,08 37,89 YES Small YES 
RomReal Ltd. 24,50 27,00 25,00 25,03 -5,71 -12,50 NO Small YES 
Badger Explorer ASA 32,00 43,00 32,00 6,60 -1,09 2,49 YES Small YES 
Grieg Seafood ASA 23,00 23,00 23,00 -0,01 3,24 -32,34 NO Small NO 
Dockwise Ltd 23,10 25,00 25,00 0,75 -4,70 -33,87 YES Large YES 
Seajacks International Ltd. 55,00 55,00 55,00 3,21 NA 26,23 YES Small YES 
London Mining Plc 18,00 22,00 17,00* 7,01 8,92 82,23 YES Small NO 
Pronova BioPharma ASA 23,00 29,00 23,00 1,08 0,93 -27,84 NO Large YES 
Ability Drilling ASA 22,00 28,00 15,00* 3,85 9,59 -20,29 YES Small NA 
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Nøtterø Sparebank 110,00 110,00 110,00 2,78 5,43 -8,62 NO Small NA 
Eastern Echo Holding Plc. 7,00 8,00 7,60 2,87 5,88 91,92 YES Large YES 
Scandinavian Clinical Nutrition AB 12,00 16,00 12,90 8,67 -3,20 NA NO Small NA 
Hafslund Infratek ASA (Infratek 
ASA) 20,00 25,00 18,00* -1,46 3,43 8,80 NO Small YES 
Aker Exploration ASA 56,00 56,00 56,00 12,17 2,08 7,92 YES Small NO 
Aker Philadelphia Shipyard ASA 57,50 57,50 57,50 4,74 -0,65 3,56 NO Small NA 
IGE Nordic AB 12,50 12,50 12,50 -1,20 -2,34 -33,90 NO Small NA 
Aqua Bio Technology 9,00 9,00 9,00 2,28 11,56 4,05 NO Small NO 
PCI Biotech Holding ASA 20,00 20,00 20,00 -10,57 -46,02 10,98 NO Small NO 
Norway Pelagic ASA 40,00 40,00 40,00 8,26 -5,43 34,90 YES Small NO 
Remedial Offshore PLC 27,00 31,00 27,00 16,47 5,74 -28,41 YES Small NO 
Bergen Group ASA 31,00 31,00 31,00 -0,99 -4,87 -26,84 YES Small NO 
Spectrum ASA 18,63 18,63 18,63 1,16 2,72 -32,69 NO Small NO 
Polarcus Limited 4,00 6,00 4,50 -9,18 -14,46 NA YES Large NO 
FLEX LNG LTD 4,50 8,00 5,50 0,73 -2,69 68,36 YES Small NO 
North Energy ASA 25,00 33,00 26,50 5,84 -0,69 -32,55 NO Small NO 
P/f Bakkafrost 27,00 31,00 31,00 11,50 14,09 28,30 NO Large YES 
Sølvtrans Holding ASA 30,00 35,00 25,00* -3,00 -5,79 -20,25 NO Small NO 
Bridge Energy ASA 22,00 26,00 22,00 -12,95 -21,78 -42,74 NO Small NO 
NetConnect ASA 3,20 3,20 3,20 -7,97 -11,60 -68,31 YES Small NO 
Dannemora Mineral AB 52,15 52,15 52,15 -3,58 -3,76 -27,86 YES Small NO 
Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA 24,20 28,20 24,20 -1,48 1,09 51,91 NO Large NO 
Morpol ASA 22,00 28,00 22,00 -6,06 -3,12 -31,14 NO Large YES 
CellCura ASA 5,00 5,00 5,00 -25,14 -22,95 -54,53 NO Small NO 
Statoil Fuel & Retail ASA 32,00 41,00 39,00* 4,28 6,20 42,89 NO Large YES 
Floatel International Ltd 14,00 16,00 14,00 -1,51 -5,76 13,49 NO Small YES 
Gjensidige Forsikring ASA 54,00 64,00 59,00* 0,29 -1,16 19,41 NO Large YES 
Norway Royal Salmon ASA 23,00 30,00 21,00* 3,47 0,69 -23,25 NO Small NO 
Sevan Drilling ASA 16,00 21,00 8,00* -2,05 -4,76 -31,44 NO Large YES 
Höegh LNG Holdings Ltd. 38,00 54,00 38,00* 3,78 4,19 42,48 NO Large YES 
Hofseth BioCare ASA 4,00 6,00 4,00 25,49 -10,59 NA NO Small NO 
Average       2,41 -1,06 -0,02       
* Amended price range  
Appendix 2 
Average initial return, return after one week and return after six months of trading (not market 
adjusted). 
Initial Return 2006-2007 2009-2011 Total 
Number of Issues 51 18 69 
Abnormal Return 2,98 -1,18 2,05 
Return after 1 week 2006-2007 2009-2011 Total 
Number of Issues 50 18 68 
Abnormal Return 2,98 -4,36 -0,58 
Return after 6 months 2006-2007 2009-2011 Total 
Number of Issues 50 16 66 
Abnormal Return 0,48 1,71 0,78 
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Appendix 3 
Various test results (Normality test, test for Heteroscedasticity, test for Autocorrelation and 
test for multicollinearity). 
Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test 
Dependent Variable p-value α H0: 
        
loginitialreturn 0,003 0,05 Rejected 
logfivedayreturn 0,000 0,05 Rejected 
logsixmreturn 0,359 0,05 Not Rejected 
 
White's General Heteroscedasticity Test 
Regressions χ
2 Critical Value H0: 
        
1) 0.04, 0.17, 0.00 3,93E-05 Rejected* 
      
2)                            II 14.44, 21.38, 19.42 9,89 Rejected 
III 0.99, 2.91, 1.47 0,21 Rejected 
IV 19.30, 26.41, 27.45 13,79 Rejected 
      
3) 0,77 0,01 Rejected 
      
4)                             I 48,00 27,99 Rejected 
II 36,38 20,71 Rejected 
III 26,97 13,79 Rejected 
IV 21,27 11,16 Rejected 
* The null hypothesis is not rejected when the dependent variable is  
return after six months of trading 
 
Durbin-Watson d statistic 
Regression d 
Number of 
Explanatory 
Variables N 
Lower 
Bound 
(dL) 
Upper 
Bound 
(dU) Conclusion 
1 1.099, 1.102, 1.193 1 48 1,503 1,585 Positive Autocorrelation 
2. II 
1.182, 1.128, 
1.075* 7 48 1,081 1,692 Zone of indecision 
2. III 1.051, 1.061, 1.238 2 48 1,285 1,446 Positive Autocorrelation 
2. IV 1.131, 1.075, 1.150 8 48 1,039 1,748 Zone of indecision 
3 1.000 1 48 1,503 1,585 Positive Autocorrelation 
4. I 1.028 10 48 0,955 1,864 Zone of indecision 
4. II 1.038 9 48 0,997 1,805 Zone of indecision 
4.III 1.065 8 48 1,039 1,748 Zone of indecision 
4.IV 1.061 7 48 1,081 1,692 Positive Autocorrelation 
* 1,075 lies below the lower bound dL (1,081) and indicates Positive Autocorrelation 
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Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) - Multicollinearity 
  1. 2. II 2. III 2. IV 3. 4. I 4. II 4. III 4. IV 
PriceRangehds 1 1,36 1,08 1,66 1         
Pricerevision      1,59 1,47 1,4 1,37 
dnb   1,22   1,22   1,2 1,2 1,2 1,19 
first  1,14  1,2  1,31 1,21 1,18 1,17 
pareto   1,45   1,51   1,57 1,53 1,52 1,31 
seb  1,13  1,18  1,29 1,29 1,21 1,21 
abg   1,12   1,2   1,16 1,15 1,12 1,09 
carnegie  1,2  1,2  1,23 1,23 1,22 1,16 
logmarketreturn     1,08 1,38   1,18 1,18     
age      1,55 1,24 1,24   
listed06_aug08           1,67       
 
